Greptile vs Snyk (2026)

Stands at F, re-based off the vendor's own changelog after the June basis cited aicodereview.cc. Breadth across classes is comfortably met, and the notable addition since the record was built is Fix with your Agent, which routes findings outward into five named coding agents through a local bridge CLI. That is an unusual integration direction for a reviewer and worth recording: Greptile positions as the reviewer that hands work to whichever agent the customer already runs.

Upgraded from P: integrations span SCM, CI/CD, IDE, container registries, cloud providers and ticketing, with Broker for private networks, which is breadth across classes rather than one ecosystem.

Upgraded from P. The June basis described parallel agents and multi-hop passes but predates v5, shipped 5 August 2026, which makes the architecture explicit: a swarm of narrowly scoped agents each exploring a single hypothesis, run in parallel and aggregated into one review. Graded F on the cosine precedent, where Swarm mode spawning specialised child agents earned F, and distinguished from blink-new, held at P because its parallel agents had no documented coordination. Here the coordination is evidenced by measured aggregate outcomes: median review time halved and comment-addressed rate rose from 52 to 66 percent, which only makes sense if the swarm's output is filtered and merged rather than concatenated.

Stands at P, re-based off the changelog. Surface coverage grew materially since the record was built, with a CLI in June and CLI onboarding in July adding a terminal path that did not previously exist, alongside PR events, mention and re-trigger invocation, MCP from four IDEs and Slack delivery. Held below F because every path still anchors to the pull request or the local development loop: Slack is a delivery destination rather than an invocation channel, and no scheduled or cron-driven review is documented anywhere. Same line that holds cubic and graphite at P while warp, goose and ellipsis reach F on chat, ticketing or event-driven invocation.

Upgraded from P: invocation spans SCM events, CI/CD gates, IDE, CLI, MCP invocation by third party AI assistants and continuous always on attack simulation, which is breadth rather than scan on commit alone.

Stands at F and is now among the best-evidenced grounding cells in the lane, alongside cubic and cosine. Two mechanisms are new to the record and both extend grounding past the repository boundary: Repo Clusters reading up to seven related repositories per review, and the Partner Program supplying maintained context for third-party APIs. The files.json mechanism is worth noting as a design choice, since it points the reviewer at existing schemas and architecture docs rather than requiring a separate knowledge base.

Upgraded from N. The June basis reasoned that learning from comments and reactions was feedback-loop adaptation belonging under Know, sourced to a dev.to post; Memory and Learning is in fact a named system with its own documentation page, its own dashboard section, five documented learning signals and an inference step that proposes new rules from observed behaviour. Graded F on the cosine precedent, where a named Memory feature persisting conventions across sessions earned F. The distinction from graphite, held at N in this same batch, is exactly that the vendor documents persistence as a capability with a mechanism rather than as a training characteristic.

State persists as platform data, project history and the AI bill of materials rather than as an agent memory layer the customer can inspect or configure.

Upgraded from P. The June basis described advisory comments plus configurable rules, which was accurate but predates auto-approve, shipped 26 June 2026. Graded F on the cubic precedent: a documented autonomy boundary with a customer-set risk ceiling and a published never-approve list is a shipped guardrail mechanism, which is what this axis grades. Beta is not a bar to F under the early access treatment, since it is open to all users rather than gated by application, unlike warp Factories. The hard exclusion list is the strongest part: auth, secrets, billing, database migrations, infrastructure, CI and public APIs are never auto-approved regardless of configuration, which is a guardrail the customer cannot switch off.

Stands at F. The axis conjunction is met on both halves independently, and the self-hosted air-gapped path with customer-supplied models is the part that matters most for the regulated buyers this vendor targets, since it removes the trust question rather than attesting to it. Recorded honestly: the SOC 2 Type II claim and the defence, healthcare and financial services customer base come from vendor marketing pages rather than a trust portal, and no named audit firm or published report was retrieved.

Stands at P, re-based off the changelog after the June basis cited greptile.com/what-is-ai-code-review, a marketing explainer. The analytics dashboard shipped 15 April 2026 and is a real reporting surface with export, and the review footer's counter and last-reviewed-commit link add per-PR traceability. Held below F on the lane-wide reading applied to graphite, cubic and sourcegraph: these measure review outcomes and team throughput, not a retained per-action record of what the agent did and why. Contrast ellipsis, which earned F because every step, tool call and message is retained and replayable. Confidence stays medium because the analytics docs page was not fetched directly.

Stands at F and is the strongest Dep cell reviewed in this lane so far. Unlike warp and cosine, where air-gapped deployment is described on a marketing page and quoted through sales, Greptile publishes the actual deployment mechanics: named services, sizing thresholds, a public repository, a Terraform path and a documented migration route between deployment methods. Both halves of the axis are met independently, deployment surface and data location control, with bring-your-own-LLM closing the inference path.

Upgraded from P: the customer selects the deployment surface and Broker keeps private SCM traffic inside their network, with FIPS validated cryptography and documented data at rest protection; regional hosting options are documented for the platform.

Upgraded from N. The June basis said custom rules are user-defined configuration and no vendor-supplied library exists, which was true then; the Partner Program shipped 22 June 2026 and is exactly a vendor-curated pack, supplying partner-maintained review rules for eight named third-party APIs, enabled by default. Held at P rather than F because these are context packs applied automatically rather than a browsable catalogue of installable agents or templates, and there is still no marketplace or gallery. AI rules import is customer-owned configuration and is recorded rather than credited.

Downgraded from F. Agent Scan, Studio, Guard and the Evo family are named product modules the vendor operates, not a library of prebuilt agents or installable packs the customer deploys; Studio is a guardrail surface rather than a template catalogue.

Upgraded from P, and this is a retrieval failure rather than product movement: Configurable Models has been documented since 26 September 2025, nine months before the record was built, and the June basis cited sacra.com rather than the vendor. Three independent forms of the axis are present, which is as strong as this cell gets: explicit customer selection, documented routing, and bring your own model on self-host. Model Inversion is a genuinely unusual routing rule and worth a comparison-page note, since it routes away from the authoring model on the vendor's own research that models catch more bugs in code written by a different model.

Undisclosed provider for Snyk's own agents. Claude is named as a discovery partner in the pairing described by the vendor, but that is a customer's coding agent being validated, not the model powering Snyk; no customer selection surface exists.

Upgraded from P, which said no public SDK is documented, sourced to sacra.com. The surface is broader than an SDK gap implies: four named REST endpoints, a hosted MCP server with a documented bearer-token setup across four IDEs, an npm CLI with machine-readable and agent-oriented output modes, a plugin in Anthropic's official marketplace, webhooks and Zapier. The MCP direction test is satisfied outward, since other assistants call Greptile to query rules and trigger reviews.

Stands at F on the qodo and cubic precedent, where the axis and the product coincide, and the case is stronger than it was in June because TREX and the security agent both shipped after the record was built. TREX is the unusual part and worth pairing on comparison pages: writing and executing targeted tests against the repository's real stack rather than a mock environment, and attaching execution evidence to the comment, is closer to a customer-facing test harness than anything else reviewed in this lane. Recorded honestly: TREX is in public beta and the security agent's benchmark claims are vendor-reported.

This is the rare vendor where the axis and the product coincide: continuous pentesting and agent red teaming are customer facing testing of agent behaviour, not just of code. Graded F on that basis rather than on the scanning heritage.

DOWNGRADED from P, the eighth correction of this identical axis error in the 30 June cohort. The June basis credited running TREX in a sandbox, navigating the repository graph and applying click-to-accept fixes as computer use; sandboxes, code graphs and the GitHub API are all programmatic interfaces, which is what the axis excludes. One genuine ambiguity is recorded rather than resolved: TREX attaches screenshots and videos as failure evidence, which implies browser-driven end-to-end tests, but running the customer's own test framework is executing their harness rather than operating software that lacks a programmatic interface, and no browser tool, computer-use capability or GUI automation is named on the TREX page or anywhere in the changelog. Would move on a documented browser tool.

Continuous Offensive Security includes web application attack simulation, which necessarily drives a browser or HTTP surface, but the vendor does not document the agent operating third party software lacking a programmatic interface, which is the axis test.